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The Case for a Federal Regulatory Sandbox for Fintech 
Companies 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“We cannot solve a problem by using the same kind of 
thinking we used when we created [it].”1 Albert Einstein 
 
Approximately 65% of Americans use at least one website or 
mobile application to manage their financial lives.2  Many of these 
financial products and services are created by financial technology 
(“fintech”) companies.3  Fintech companies, like Credit Karma4 and 
PayPal,5 are businesses that leverage innovation and technology to 
develop improved financial services for businesses and consumers in the 
marketplace.6  Currently, there are over 4,000 fintech companies 
operating in the United States and United Kingdom alone.7  Furthermore, 
investment in fintech companies has grown to over $24 billion 
worldwide.8 
 
 1. David Mielach, 5 Business Tips from Albert Einstein, BUSINESS NEWS DAILY (Apr. 
18, 2012, 12:36 PM), https://www.businessnewsdaily.com/2381-albert-einstein-business-
tips.html. 
 2. See Prosper Marketplace Financial Wellness Survey, PROSPER MARKETPLACE, INC. 5 
(Feb. 2016), https://www.prosper.com/about-us/wp-content/uploads/FinancialWellnessSurv 
eyv5-1.pdf (conducting a survey to determine, among other things, the American use of 
technology in personal finance). 
 3. See Ranking the Top Fintech Companies, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 6, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/04/07/business/dealbook/The-Fintech-Power-
Grab.html?mcubz=0&_r=0 (discussing the broad definition of a fintech company and the 
various roles within the financial services marketplace these companies occupy). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Regarding Special Purpose 
National Bank Charters for Fintech Companies at the Georgetown University Law Center 1 
(Dec. 2, 2016) [hereinafter Thomas J. Curry, Georgetown Law Remarks], https://www 
.occ.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2016/pub-speech-2016-152.pdf. 
 8. Id.  
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The United Kingdom, Australia,9 and other countries around the 
world have begun to implement a novel regulatory concept called the 
“regulatory sandbox” to enable fintech companies to innovate and test 
products, services, and business models without having to worry about 
certain regulatory constraints and liabilities.10  The sandboxes have been 
implemented to both spur innovation and attract prospective fintech 
companies to their favorable regulatory environments.11  The United 
States, however, has declined to follow suit.12 
Due to the current regulatory landscape in the United States, 
fintech companies are often faced with ambiguity and confusion as to 
which laws, regulations, and agencies govern their products and 
services.13  In an effort to ease this regulatory burden on fintech 
companies, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) 
announced its plans to create a special purpose national bank charter for 
Fintech Companies (“Fintech Charter”).14  Obtaining a Fintech Charter 
from the OCC essentially places a fintech company under the same 
 
 9. Regulatory Sandbox, AUSTL. SECURITIES & INVESTMENTS COMMISSION, http://
asic.gov.au/for-business/your-business/innovation-hub/regulatory-sandbox/ (last updated 
June 14, 2017) (providing an in-depth view of Australia’s regulatory initiative). 
 10. Stephanie Forshee, Barriers Remain to Letting US Fintechs Play in the Regulatory 
‘Sandbox,’ INSIDE COUNSEL, http://www.insidecounsel.com/2017/06/01/barriers-remain-to-
letting-us-fintechs-play-in-the (June 1, 2017, 12:10 PM). 
 11. See Mike Faden, Regulatory Sandboxes Provide “Safe Spaces” for Fintech Payment 
Services Innovation, AM. EXPRESS, https://www.americanexpress.com/us/content/foreign-
exchange/articles/regulatory-sandboxes-for-innovative-payment-solutions/ (last accessed 
Feb. 10, 2018) (stating the major countries and nations that have already implemented a 
regulatory sandbox and the purposes of a regulatory sandbox). 
 12. See e.g., The Financial Services Innovation Act of 2016, H.R. 6118, 114th Cong. 
(2016) (providing information on The Financial Services Innovation Act of 2016, which 
would have created a federal regulatory sandbox in the United States); Paul Sweeney, Fintech 
Sandbox? States, OCC Mull Regulatory Options, DEBANKED (May 2, 2017), http://
debanked.com/2017/05/fintech-sandbox-states-occ-mull-regulatory-options/ (providing 
information on state discussions regarding the creation of a “New England Regulatory Fintech 
Sandbox”); see Forshee, supra note 10 (discussing barriers that remain to creation of a 
regulatory sandbox in the United States). 
 13. See Nicholas Elliott, Where Fin-Tech is Struggling with Regulation, WALL ST. J., 
https://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2015/11/24/where-fin-tech-is-struggling-with-
regulation/ (Nov. 24, 2015, 1:28 PM) (analyzing the major areas of concern amongst fintech 
companies in the United States). 
 14. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, EXPLORING SPECIAL PURPOSE 
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regulatory framework as any other national bank, thus reducing the 
regulatory ambiguity commonly faced by fintech companies.15 
Currently, the OCC is facing pushback from state regulators, 
consumer protection groups, and community banks, all of whom argue 
that the OCC lacks the legal authority to establish a Fintech Charter.16  
Other opponents suggest that the Fintech Charters offered by the OCC 
would provide a legitimate option for only the largest fintech companies, 
due to uncertainty as to capital and other requirements for a Fintech 
Charter.17  Therefore, only a true regulatory sandbox could benefit fintech 
companies of all sizes, especially those that lack either the capital and 
expertise to seek a Fintech Charter from the OCC or the ability to navigate 
the United States’ complex regulatory landscape with proficiency.18    
This Note discusses the history, value, and function of the 
regulatory sandbox concept, as well as the current status of implementing 
a regulatory sandbox in the United States.  Part II chronicles the history 
of the regulatory sandbox and provides a brief introduction to the 
categories of fintech companies that stand to benefit from the 
implementation of a regulatory sandbox.19  Part III discusses the United 
States’ attempts to implement federal and state regulatory sandboxes, 
compares the proposed federal sandbox with the United Kingdom’s 
current sandbox model, and addresses the benefits and drawbacks of 
creating a fintech sandbox as compared to the OCC’s proposed Fintech 
Charter.20  Finally, Part IV concludes by reiterating the importance of 
adopting a regulatory sandbox in the United States, both to reduce 
regulatory ambiguity and encourage fintech companies to operate and 
innovate within the United States.21 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Lalita Clozel, State Regulators Sue OCC over Fintech Charter, AM. BANKER, Apr. 
26, 2017, at 1–3.  
 17. See Gregory Roberts, OCC Fintech Charter May Be a Poor Fit for Fintechs, BNA 
(Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.bna.com/occ-fintech-charter-n57982083191/ (arguing that the 
OCC’s Fintech Charter would only benefit the largest fintechs and would not affect the 
business operations of smaller fintechs).  
 18. See Mark Brnovich, Regulatory Sandboxes Can Help States Advance Fintech, AM. 
BANKER, Sept. 5, 2017, at 1–5 (discussing the challenges to fintech companies under the 
United States’ current regulatory landscape).  
 19. See infra Part II. 
 20. See infra Part III. 
 21. See infra Part IV. 
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II. FINTECH AND THE UK’S REGULATORY SANDBOX 
A. What is a Fintech Company? 
Fintech encompasses all forms of innovative digital and software 
technologies applied directly to the financial services sector.22  The 
fintech moniker embraces almost any company that is using novel 
technology to solve existing problems in the financial services 
landscape.23  While “fintech” is a relatively new term, technological 
innovation has long been present in the banking and financial services 
industry.24  One notable characteristic of fintech companies, as opposed 
to banks, is that they utilize disruptive innovation to chip away at the 
financial services market share of the banking industry.25   For example, 
peer-to-peer lending fintech companies match providers of funds with 
borrowers of funds.26  As a result, these fintech companies utilize 
technology to engage in financial intermediation—a financial service 
traditionally offered by the banking industry.27  A few well-known 
examples of American fintech companies include Credit Karma, PayPal, 
SoFi, Venmo, Coinbase, Lending Club, and Kickstarter.28  
Fintech companies are not only competing with banks as a source 
for lending, but have also imbedded themselves into other financial-
related markets.29  Fintech companies like Envestnet now operate in the 
personal finance and investment management market to offer consumers 
cheaper alternatives to expensive brokers.30  Payment fintechs like PayPal 
 
 22. See Kathryn Reed Edge, Fintech: Fad or Future, TBA LAW BLOG (Aug. 1, 2017, 
11:00 PM), http://www.tba.org/journal/fintech-fad-or-future (“Loosely defined, a ‘fintech’ 
company is a firm that uses new technology and innovation with available resources in order 
to compete in the marketplace of traditional financial institutions and intermediaries in the 
delivery of financial services.”). 
 23. Ranking the Top Fintech Companies, supra note 3. 
 24. See History of ATMs and a New Way to Bank, BBVA, https://www.bbva.com/en/
history-atms-new-way-bank/ (last updated June 27, 2017) (indicating that banks have been 
innovating since 1967 when Barclays unveiled the first ATM in London). 
 25. John L. Douglas, New Wine into Old Bottles: Fintech Meets the Bank Regulatory 
World, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 17, 21 (2016). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. (“[T]he entry of nonbank competitors using new technologies to capture what 
has traditionally been the hallowed turf of the banking industry is an oft-repeated story . . . 
.”). 
 28. Ranking the Top Fintech Companies, supra note 3. 
 29. See Ranking the Top Fintech Companies, supra note 3. (laying out the various sectors 
of the financial market in which fintech companies operate). 
 30. Ranking the Top Fintech Companies, supra note 3. 
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and Venmo allow merchants and consumers to avoid fees which are 
normally associated with credit card transactions.31  Fintech companies 
are also competing with traditional financial institutions in Wall Street 
trading, data analytics, national and international currency transfers, and 
crowdfunding sectors of the financial market.32  To further explain and 
simplify the fintech ecosystem, Pricewaterhouse Coopers (“PwC”) 
coined what it calls the “As, Bs, Cs, and Ds” of fintech firms.33  “As” are 
major financial institutions such as Bank of America, Chase, Wells 
Fargo, and Allstate.34  “Bs” are large technology companies that have 
some operations in the financial services marketplace, such as Apple and 
Google.35  “Cs” are the firms, like MasterCard, that facilitate financial 
services transactions by providing infrastructure or technology to other 
fintech firms.36  Finally, “Ds” are the disruptors, or the start-ups focused 
on a singular innovative technology or business model.37 
Regardless of whether the company is an “A” or a “D,” the key 
element central to the business model of all fintech companies is to 
benefit consumers through “lower[ing] costs, expand[ing] access to 
unserved markets, and [providing] user-friendly interfaces” by disrupting 
the traditional financial marketplace.38  This disruption, however, has also 
created problems for both fintech firms and regulators.39  Because fintech 
companies are not subject to all of the same regulations and requirements 
as a traditional bank, regulatory confusion and concerns over consumer 
protection have generated unease amongst politicians and fintech 
companies alike as to the future of the United States fintech industry.40 
 
 31. Ranking the Top Fintech Companies, supra note 3. 
 32. Ranking the Top Fintech Companies, supra note 3. 
 33. Haskell Garfinkel & Dean Nicolacakis, Q&A: What is Fintech?, PWC 2 (Apr. 2016), 
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial-services/publications/viewpoints/assets/pwc-fsi-what-
is-fintech.pdf. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id.  
 38. See Matthew D. Cutts & Brandon C. Román, The Future of Fintech: A Washington 
Perspective, 19 FINTECH L. REP. NL 1 (Nov./Dec. 2016) (discussing the benefits of fintech 
companies to the financial industry and the regulatory problems faced by both fintech 
companies and regulators alike). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
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B. Regulatory Sandbox:  The First Example 
The United Kingdom, the pioneer of the regulatory sandbox, first 
introduced the sandbox concept in 2015 through an initiative called 
“Project Innovate” by its Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”).41  This 
project was aimed at allowing fintech companies to introduce their 
innovative products, services, business models, and delivery mechanisms 
to the financial market, outside the full set of regulatory constraints 
imposed by the FCA.42  By lowering administrative barriers and costs to 
both market entrants and established financial institutions, the FCA’s 
sandbox sought to provide a safe space for fintech companies to 
innovate.43 
In order to accomplish this goal, the FCA developed a flexible 
and supervised regulatory sandbox.44  Through the creation of a “sandbox 
unit” that is charged with handling sandbox applications and supervising 
the testing process by the fintech companies, the FCA is able to make 
decisions regarding which regulations to relax for a particular fintech 
company on a case-by-case basis.45  Therefore, Project Innovate is not 
tailored to a discrete category of fintech firms.46  Instead, it is aware that 
each fintech firm faces unique regulatory challenges and will help each 
firm individually during testing in the sandbox.47 
Equally as important as the flexibility of Project Innovate is the 
FCA’s supervision over the testing process.48  In order to adequately 
protect consumers and the financial system, fintech companies accepted 
 
 41. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., REGULATORY SANDBOX 1, 2 (Nov. 2015), https://
www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/regulatory-sandbox.pdf [hereinafter FCA REGULATORY 
SANDBOX OUTLINE] (outlining the FCA’s plan to implement a regulatory sandbox). 
 42. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., REGULATORY SANDBOX, https://www.fca.org.uk/fir 
ms/regulatory-sandbox (last updated Dec. 15, 2017) [hereinafter FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX 
DISCUSSION] (providing an in-depth discussion on the United Kingdom’s regulatory sandbox). 
 43. FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX OUTLINE, supra note 41, at 2; see DR. PHILIP TRILLMICH 
& KATRINA JOKIC, WHITE & CASE, TECHNOLOGY NEWSFLASH: UK ‘REGULATORY SANDBOX’ 
TO FOSTER FINTECH INNOVATION (Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/
alert/uk-regulatory-sandbox-foster-fintech-innovation (discussing the goals and purpose of 
the FCA’s regulatory sandbox). 
 44. FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX OUTLINE, supra note 41, at 2. 
 45. FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX OUTLINE, supra note 41, at 3. 
 46. See FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX OUTLINE, supra note 41, at 3 (indicating that the 
FCA’s sandbox unit will consider applications and monitor the testing process for each firm). 
 47. FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX OUTLINE, supra note 41, at 3. 
 48. See FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX OUTLINE, supra note 41, at 3 (considering consumer 
safeguards to be among the three key questions when investigating the feasibility of sandbox 
implementation). 
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into the regulatory sandbox work directly with the FCA and its sandbox 
unit throughout the testing process.49  This ensures that a balance is struck 
between enforcing regulations essential to consumer protection and 
relaxing unnecessary regulations that burden the fintech firm.50 
The FCA began accepting applications from fintech companies 
in May 2016 for its first sandbox cohort.51  In order to be eligible for the 
sandbox, a fintech company must operate within one of seven sectors of 
business within the United Kingdom.52  These sectors include retail 
banking, retail lending, general insurance and pensions, pensions and 
retirement income, retail investments, investment management, and 
wholesale financial markets.53  Additionally, the fintech company must 
satisfy the following criteria to qualify for the FCA’s sandbox 
protections:  (1) the fintech company must be seeking to deliver 
innovation that is regulated in the U.K. financial services market; (2) the 
innovation must be ground-breaking or significantly different from those 
already in the marketplace; (3) the innovation must benefit consumers 
and promote competition; (4) the fintech company must display a genuine 
need to test its innovation within the sandbox; and (5) the fintech 
company must have a well-developed plan for testing and be prepared to 
test the innovation.54 
Thus far, the FCA’s sandbox has had great success.55  The FCA 
tested eighteen businesses as part of Project Innovate’s first cohort, 
twenty-four more fintech companies have been approved for testing as 
 
 49. See FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX OUTLINE, supra note 41, at 3 (“[The sandbox unit] 
will be responsible for considering sandbox applications and monitoring the testing process). 
 50. See FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX OUTLINE, supra note 41, at 3 (“We believe that it is 
feasible for the FCA to reduce some of the existing regulatory barriers to firms that are testing 
new ideas, while also maintaining suitable safeguards.”). 
 51. See TRILLMICH & JOKIC, supra note 43. 
 52. See Regulatory Sandbox – Application Form, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., https://www. 
fca.org.uk/regulatory-sandbox-application-form (last updated June 16, 2017) [hereinafter 
FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX APPLICATION FORM] (displaying the criteria for a fintech 
company to apply to the FCAs sandbox). 
 53. Id. 
 54. See How to Prepare a Sandbox Application, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., https://
www.fca.org.uk/firms/regulatory-sandbox/prepare-application (last updated Dec. 15, 2017) 
(providing fintech companies with detailed instructions for determining whether they are 
eligible to participate in the sandbox). 
 55. See e.g., STUART DAVIS ET AL., FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX UPDATE: SUCCESSES IN 
ROUND ONE, APPLICATION WINDOW FOR ROUND THREE OPEN, LATHAM & WATKINS (June 16, 
2017), http://www.latham.london/2017/06/fca-regulatory-sandbox-update-successes-in-ro 
und-one-application-window-for-round-three-open/ (indicating that round one of the FCA’s 
sandbox was a success and that the FCA intends to continue this success with future cohorts). 
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part of the second cohort, and applications for cohort three have already 
closed.56  Looking to the success of the FCA’s sandbox in the United 
Kingdom, many other countries around the world have developed similar, 
but not identical, sandboxes of their own.57  For example, Australia, 
Bahrain, Canada, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Switzerland, 
Thailand, and Russia have all implemented some form of a regulatory 
sandbox .58   
III. STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATORY SANDBOX EFFORTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
A. State Efforts at Creating a Regulatory Sandbox 
Currently, no state or region in the United States has enacted its 
own regulatory sandbox.59  There is, however, movement in Arizona, 
Illinois, and amongst a coalition of the six New England states to create 
a state- or regional-level fintech sandbox.60  This state-level movement is 
motivated by both state desire to not be viewed as an impediment to 
 
 56. Regulatory Sandbox – Cohort 3, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., https://www.fca.org.uk/firms 
/regulatory-sandbox/cohort-3 (last updated Aug. 8, 2017); Regulatory Sandbox – Cohort 2, 
FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/regulatory-sandbox/cohort-2 (last 
updated June 15, 2017); Regulatory Sandbox – Cohort 1, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., https://
www.fca.org.uk/firms/regulatory-sandbox/cohort-1 (last updated June 15, 2017). 
 57. Dan Cummings, Regulatory Sandboxes: A Practice For Innovation That Is Trending 
Worldwide, ETH NEWS (Feb. 28, 2017, 8:10 PM), https://www.ethnews.com/regulatory-
sandboxes-a-practice-for-innovation-that-is-trending-worldwide. 
 58. See Jessie Willms, New Regulatory Sandbox Could Boost Blockchain Tech in 
Canada, NASDAQ (Mar. 7, 2017, 12:12:24 PM), http://www.nasdaq.com/article/new-
regulatory-sandbox-could-boost-blockchain-tech-in-canada-cm757328 (discussing the 
Canadian Security Administrators’ launch of a “Regulatory Sandbox Initiative”); Cummings, 
supra note 57 (discussing the trend of implementing a regulatory sandbox that started in the 
United Kingdom and spread to other countries across the world); AUSTL. SECURITIES & 
INVESTMENT COMMISSION, supra note 9; CENTRAL BANK OF BAHRAIN, REGULATORY 
SANDBOX FRAMEWORK 1 http://www.cbb.gov.bh/assets/Whitepapers/
Regulatory_Sandbox_Framework.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2018); FinTech Regulatory 
Sandbox, MONETARY AUTHORITY OF SINGAPORE, http://www.mas.gov.sg/Singapore-
Financial-Centre/Smart-Financial-Centre/FinTech-Regulatory-Sandbox.aspx (last modified 
Jan. 9, 2017). 
 59. Sara Merken, States Embrace Fintech Sandbox Concept as Federal Action Stalls, 
BNA (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.bna.com/states-embrace-fintech-n73014464317/ 
[hereinafter Merken, States Embrace Fintech]; see Brnovich, supra note 18, at 4–5 
(discussing the movement of Arizona policymakers toward a regulatory sandbox); see also 
Sweeney, supra note 12 (discussing the proposed “New England Regulatory FinTech 
Sandbox” in Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and 
Connecticut).  
 60. Sweeney, supra note 12.  
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innovation and state awareness of the regulatory burdens on fintech 
companies to comply with regulatory requirements which may be 
applicable in each state.61  
Outside the scope of federal regulations and requirements placed 
on fintech companies, a fintech company often incurs thousands of 
dollars in costs and fees simply through the process of seeking approval 
and a license to operate in a state.62  If the state regulatory burden is scaled 
to include compliance and operation in all fifty states, a typical fintech 
company can expect millions in expenses and years of frustration in the 
pursuit of national expansion.63  Arizona Attorney General Mark 
Brnovich has noted that this problem forces start-ups to pursue one of 
three routes:  (1) the start-up can bear the cost and delays of regulatory 
compliance and hope that no other company rolls out a similar innovation 
in the interim;64 (2) the fintech start-up could elect to skip the licensing 
process, either due to lack of capital or fear of newcomers, and “hope 
they don’t get caught;”65 or (3) the fintech company could decide to close 
its doors and move the firm abroad, likely to a place where regulations 
are uniform and tailored to facilitate the growth of small start-ups.66 
Gradually, states and regions are realizing that the lack of 
regulatory uniformity across state lines functions as a barrier to 
innovation rather than as a safeguard for consumers.67  By overburdening 
fintech start-ups, the patchwork state regulatory system only serves to 
create an additional problem for a company already dealing with the 
challenge of raising capital and developing a product.68  One possible 
 
 61. Sweeney, supra note 12.  
 62. See Brnovich, supra note 18, at 1 (indicating that compliance costs and legal work 
are a significant regulatory barrier for start-up companies). 
 63. Brnovich, supra note 18, at 1. 
 64. See Brnovich, supra note 18, at 1 (“Such delay and expense is unacceptable in an 
industry where today’s startup ideas quickly become yesterday’s news . . . .”). 
 65. Brnovich, supra note 18, at 1. 
 66. See Brnovich, supra note 18, at 2 (“[O]ur global competitors are certainly exploiting 
their regulatory advantage to get ahead in fintech.”). 
 67. See Brnovich, supra note 18, at 3 (discussing the movement of Arizona policymakers 
toward a regulatory sandbox); see also Sweeney, supra note 12 (discussing the proposed 
“New England Regulatory FinTech Sandbox” in Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut). 
 68. See Brnovich, supra note 18, at 1 (discussing the need for a state-level regulatory 
sandbox and the problems faced by fintech firms in today’s regulatory landscape). 
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solution to this dilemma would be the creation of a state-level regulatory 
sandbox for fintech companies.69   
To this end, David Cotney, the former Massachusetts 
Commissioner of Banks, and Cornelius Hurley, director of Boston 
University’s Center for Finance, Law, and Policy, have conceptualized 
what has come to be known as the “New England Regulatory FinTech 
Sandbox” (“NERFS”).70  This proposed sandbox would take the form of 
a coalition between Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, 
Rhode Island, and Connecticut.71  While NERFS is still in its infancy, it 
has been received with “universal openness” from financial regulators in 
all six states.72  NERFS will “stitch[] together elements of [the U.K. 
sandbox] . . . and the European Union’s ‘passport’ model for cross-border 
banking operations.”73  Essentially, NERFS would bring uniformity to 
fintech regulation across the six participating New England states and 
allow a fintech company licensed to test within one state to conduct 
business in any of the other five states.74  This practice would be 
analogous to the European Union’s (“EU”) passport model which allows 
a bank operating in one EU member state to open branches and provide 
services, without further authorization, in other EU member states.75  
Therefore, NERFS participants could expect uniform regulatory 
standards regardless of which member state or states they choose to 
operate out of.76  With the New England states’ regulators on board, 
American fintech companies would finally be able to enjoy some of the 
same sandbox benefits as their foreign counterparts, at least within 
geographical limits of NERFS member states.77  Furthermore, there is no 
indication that a fintech operating within the boundaries of NERFS would 
be precluded from seeking licensing to operate within a non-member 
 
 69. See Brnovich, supra note 18, at 3 (discussing the need for a state-level regulatory 
sandbox). 
 70. Sweeney, supra note 12. 
 71. Sweeney, supra note 12. 
 72. Sweeney, supra note 12. 
 73. Sweeney, supra note 12. 
 74. Sweeney, supra note 12. 
 75. Maria J. Nieto & Larry D. Wall, Breaking Down Geographic Barriers on Banks: U.S. 
and EU Recent Experiences, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA (July 2015), https://
www.frbatlanta.org/cenfis/publications/notesfromthevault/1507.  
 76. See Sweeney, supra note 12 (“In harmonizing the regulatory regime for the sandbox 
across state lines . . . the program emulates the EU’s ‘passport.’  [A] bank licensed in one EU 
country [is] able to . . . operat[e] seamlessly throughout the [other] states of the EU . . . .”). 
 77. Sweeney, supra note 12. 
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state.78  Therefore, a fintech operating within all NERFS states could also 
choose to provide products and services to North Carolina residents, 
although the fintech would be without the regulatory harmonies it 
experiences within NERFS.79 
Contrary to the regional NERFS approach, Arizona and Illinois 
have taken steps to implement state-level sandboxes within their 
respective geographic boundaries.80  Arizona was the first state to 
announce its own sandbox plans, and draft legislation in the state would 
allow fintech companies to test innovations on up to 5,000 consumers 
within its sandbox.81  Attorney General Brnovich states that Arizona’s 
sandbox will require certain consumer protection safeguards, but that the 
initiative would also reduce regulatory and licensing burdens on 
fintechs.82  In Illinois, lawmakers are planning to mirror Arizona’s 
sandbox approach and hope to introduce the bill in their next legislative 
session.83  
State-level sandboxes, whether regional or confined to a singular 
state, would unquestionably ease regulatory and licensing burdens on 
fintechs.84  Furthermore, state sandboxes could provide these benefits to 
fintechs while simultaneously augmenting U.S. competitiveness in the 
global fintech marketplace during times of federal gridlock.85  However, 
while there is “real potential value to states serving as true ‘laboratories 
of democracy,’” a few major problems still plague state initiatives.86  
First, should Arizona and Illinois cause other states to follow suit and 
implement their own sandbox, the purpose of a sandbox—to decrease 
regulatory burdens and ambiguity—could be defeated by each state 
 
 78. See Sweeney, supra note 12 (indicating that the regulatory regime is only harmonized 
among the NERFS states, and making no indication that a NERFS fintech could not also seek 
licensing with non-member states). 
 79. Sweeney, supra note 12. 
 80. Merken, States Embrace Fintech, supra note 59.   
 81. Merken, States Embrace Fintech, supra note 59. 
 82. Merken, States Embrace Fintech, supra note 59. 
 83. Merken, States Embrace Fintech, supra note 59. 
 84. Brnovich, supra note 18, at 3. 
 85. Brnovich, supra note 18, at 3. 
 86. See Brian Knight, How the CFPB Could Help State Regulatory Sandboxes, MEDIUM 
(July 5, 2017), https://finregrag.com/how-the-cfpb-could-help-state-regulatory-sandboxes-
d299c2e95ca5 [hereinafter Knight, CFPB Helps State Regulatory Sandboxes] (analyzing 
some of the problems associated with a state-level regulatory sandbox and the possible 
solutions necessary to ensure an effective state sandbox). 
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enacting a sandbox with distinct rules and procedures.87  This issue 
indicates that regional sandboxes, like NERFS, would at least reduce this 
concern by providing fintechs with uniform standards across multiple 
borders.88  Second, applicable to regional and state-specific sandboxes 
alike, federal regulators from agencies such as the Bureau of Consumer 
Financial Protection (“CFPB”) would still maintain the authority to 
enforce a federal regulation upon a fintech company operating within a 
state sandbox.89  Absent promulgation of a rule by these federal regulators 
exempting, for example, NERFS participating fintech companies from 
certain conduct, it seems unlikely that any fintech company would “bet 
the business” on federal non-enforcement.90  Therefore, until the day the 
federal government backs a state-led sandbox initiative with consistent 
regulation and possible exemptions, it would seem prudent to strive for a 
federal fintech sandbox.91 
B. A Federal Attempt:  The Financial Services Innovation Act of 
201692 
In 2016, Congressman Patrick McHenry of North Carolina 
introduced H.R. 6118, the “Financial Services Innovation Act of 2016” 
(“FSIA”), to the House of Representatives, which would have created a 
federal regulatory sandbox.93  Development on the FSIA, however, has 
been stagnant since October 2016, likely due to both the OCC’s strong 
opposition to a federal sandbox and the OCC’s emerging Fintech Charter 
program.94  Former Comptroller of the Currency, Thomas Curry, stated 
unequivocally that the OCC does not support the sandbox approach 
because (1) the agency itself does not have the authority to waive 
compliance with regulations; (2) it “never makes sense” to waive 
 
 87. Merken, States Embrace Fintech, supra note 59. 
 88. Merken, States Embrace Fintech, supra note 59. 
 89. See Knight, CFPB Helps State Regulatory Sandboxes, supra note 86 (analyzing some 
of the problems associated with a state-level regulatory sandbox). 
 90. Knight, CFPB Helps State Regulatory Sandboxes, supra note 86. 
 91. See Knight, CFPB Helps State Regulatory Sandboxes, supra note 86 (laying out the 
benefits and drawbacks of a state-level fintech sandbox). 
 92. The Financial Services Innovation Act of 2016, H.R. 6118, 114th Cong. (2016). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id.; see Lalita Clozel, OCC’s Curry Rules Out ‘Safe Space’ for Fintech Companies, 
AM. BANKER, Nov. 3, 2016, at 1–2 [hereinafter Clozel, OCC’s Curry] (discussing the OCC’s 
opposition to a regulatory sandbox and preference for a Fintech Charter). 
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compliance with consumer protection or safety and soundness; and (3) 
ensuring the soundness and safety of financial products before rolling 
them out is the responsibility of the fintech.95  The FSIA, however, 
remains an important milestone, because a similar sandbox bill could 
certainly be re-introduced at a later date.96  This day could come sooner 
rather than later, as Congressman McHenry has unequivocally stated that 
he intends to promptly re-introduce the FSIA to Congress.97 
Under the FSIA, the United States’ regulatory sandbox initiative 
would have incorporated a two-pronged approach.98  First, the FSIA 
would create a government-wide “fintech oversight regime.”99  In order 
to implement this regime, the FSIA would have required each of the 
following federal agencies to establish their own Financial Services 
Innovation Office (“FSIO”):  (1) the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System; (2) the CFPB; (3) the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (“CFTC”); (4) the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development; (5) the Department of the Treasury; (6) the Farm Credit 
Administration; (7) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; (8) the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency; (9) the Federal Trade Commission; 
(10) the National Credit Union Administration Board; (11) the OCC; and 
(12) the Securities and Exchange Commission.100  Initially, the FSIA 
requires each of these agencies to identify areas of regulation applicable 
to financial innovation that they would consider modifying or waiving 
under the sandbox, and to utilize the newly created FSIOs to “promote 
financial innovations” through such a waiver or modification.101  
Furthermore, each agency’s FSIO director and one state banking 
supervisor would comprise the FSIO Liaison Committee, a body tasked 
 
 95. Clozel, OCC’s Curry, supra note 94. 
 96. See Susan Gault-Brown & John Sullivan, Foreign Regulators Easing Regulatory 
Burdens on Fintech Companies – Will the U.S. Follow Suit?, WSGR FINTECH UPDATE (May 
2017), https://www.wsgr.com/publications/PDFSearch/fintech-update/May2017/index.htm 
(analyzing the FSIA and the status of a regulatory sandbox in the United States). 
 97. Sara Merken, Fintech Firms May Receive More No-Action Letters from CFPB, 
[2017] Banking Daily (BNA) No. 186, at 2 (Sept. 27, 2017). 
 98. See H.R. 6118 §§ 2–6 (discussing the establishment of FSIOs at federal agencies and 
the ability of a covered person to petition the federal agencies for an enforceable compliance 
agreement). 
 99. See C. Todd Gibson & Tyler Kirk, Financial Services Innovation Act: The U.S. Wants 
a Sandbox Too, THE NAT’L L. REV. (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/
financial-services-innovation-act-us-wants-sandbox-too (laying out the framework of the 
FSIA and the two-pronged approach employed by the FSIA). 
 100. H.R. 6118 § 2(2). 
 101. Id. § 3. 
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with facilitating the cooperation of each FSIO.102  Thus, the FSIOs and 
the FSIO Liaison Committee comprise the oversight regime prong.103 
The second prong of the FSIA establishes the sandbox itself, 
allowing a “covered person” (a fintech firm “that offers or intends to offer 
a financial innovation”) to petition one or more FSIOs for an “alternative 
compliance plan under an ‘enforceable compliance agreement.’”104  In 
submitting a petition for an alternative compliance plan, a fintech firm 
must first delineate the regulatory waivers or modifications sought, and 
subsequently demonstrate that the firm’s proposed financial innovation 
would satisfy the following conditions:  (1) serve the public interest; (2) 
improve access to financial products or services; (3) present no systemic 
risk to the United States financial system; and (4) promote consumer 
protection.105 
Upon submitting a petition to one or more FSIO agencies, a 
covered person automatically triggers the safe harbor provision of FSIA 
for the duration of the period between the petition submittal and the 
agency decision on the petition.106  Under this provision, a fintech 
company is protected from agency enforcement action “relating to the 
financial innovation that was the subject of the petition.”107  In order to 
balance out this added layer of protection for fintech companies, the FSIA 
also authorized federal agencies to seek injunctive relief upon a 
determination that the fintech innovation in question poses a threat to 
consumers or presents a systemic risk to the financial system.108 
Once a petition is approved by the relevant FSIO and the parties 
agree to the enforceable compliance agreement’s terms and conditions, 
the fintech company and its potential innovation are officially operating 
within the sandbox.109  At this stage, the fintech company enjoys the 
modifications or waivers granted by the compliance agreement, as well 
as a limitation on enforcement actions brought by other federal or state 
 
 102. Id. § 5. 
 103. See id. §§ 2–6 (discussing the creation of FSIOs and the FSIO Liaison Committee). 
 104. See id. §§ 2, 6 (defining “covered person” and allowing a covered person to petition 
the relevant agency for an enforceable compliance agreement); see also Gibson & Kirk, supra 
note 99 (laying out the framework of the FSIA and its two-pronged approach). 
 105. Id. § 6(b). 
 106. Id. § 6(d). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. § 6(d)(2). 
 109. Id. § 8. 
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agencies.110  Only in the case of a judicial determination that the FSIO’s 
approval of the fintech innovation was arbitrary, capricious, and caused 
substantial harm to consumers can a state commence an enforcement 
action against a fintech firm operating within the sandbox.111  Therefore, 
the FSIA provides fintech firms with increased safety from federal or 
state enforcement actions while simultaneously reserving some 
enforcement power to the state in which the fintech firm is operating.112 
All in all, the FSIA would have created a federal oversight regime 
comprised of twelve FSIOs and a FSIO Liaison Committee to supervise 
the operation of the proposed regulatory sandbox.113  In order to provide 
a safe space for innovation, the FSIA also incorporated appropriate 
safeguards for consumers, the financial system, and fintech firms 
operating within the sandbox.114  The FSIA, however, is stagnant in 
Congress and merely serves as an example of what a federal regulatory 
sandbox might look like in the future.115 
C. Comparing the FSIA to the FCA’s Project Innovate 
Not all sandboxes are created equal.  The unique financial system 
of each nation or country will necessitate the development of a sandbox 
tailored to its specific needs.116  While the main goal of a sandbox—
allowing fintech companies to “test innovative products, services, 
business models and delivery mechanisms in the real market, with real 
consumers[,]”117 without fear of certain regulatory consequences—might 
 
 110. See id. § 8(d)(1)(B) (“a State may not commence an enforcement action against the 
covered person . . . if the covered person provides the State with the enforcement compliance 
agreement and a statement of the policies and procedures the covered person has in place to 
comply with State laws . . . .”). 
 111. Id. § 8(d)(2). 
 112. See id. §§ 2–8 (providing information on The Financial Services Innovation Act of 
2016, which would create a federal regulatory sandbox in the United States). 
 113. Id. § 2(2), (6). 
 114. See id. §§ 2–6 (comprising the oversight regime prong by establishing FSIOs at 
twelve federal agencies which receive petitions from fintechs). 
 115. See Gault-Brown & Sullivan, supra note 96 (“Although the proposed bill died in 
committee, a similar bill could be re-introduced in the current or future Congress.”). 
 116. See Patrick McHenry, CFPB’s ‘Project Catalyst’ Failed. Fintech Deserves Better, 
AM. BANKER, Apr. 25, 2017, at 3 (“While it is true that the American financial system—and 
therefore our financial regulators—are different than other countries, that does not mean we 
cannot put forward policies that allow for more regulatory flexibility.”). 
 117. FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX OUTLINE, supra note 41, at 1; see H.R. 6118 § 4(a) 
(establishing FSIOs to “promote financial innovations.”). 
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ring true across all sandbox models, the tools and framework used to 
accomplish this goal certainly differ.118 
Common to both the FSIA and the FCA’s sandbox is the 
emphasis placed on consumer benefit and safety, flexibility, and 
supervision.119  Regulatory flexibility allows fintech firms in either 
sandbox to seek agency guidance, petition for regulatory modifications 
or waivers, and relinquish the threat of enforcement actions for the 
duration of the sandbox test.120  To counteract the flexibility of reduced 
regulation, fintech companies operating within either sandbox are closely 
supervised by their respective regulatory agencies—the FSIOs of the 
FSIA and the FCA’s sandbox units—to ensure safety to consumers and 
the respective nations’ financial system.121 
The frameworks of the FSIA and the FCA’s sandbox differ, 
however, primarily due to the distinct regulatory environment in which 
they operate.122  For example, the U.K. financial system is comprised of 
only five regulatory agencies, while the U.S. financial system 
incorporates twelve federal regulators working alongside myriad state 
bank, insurance, and securities regulators.123  While the FCA’s sandbox 
indicates that it is the only agency in the United Kingdom that could take 
enforcement action against a fintech company, fintech firms in the United 
States must worry about both federal and state agency enforcement 
actions.124  Therefore, the FSIA framework explicitly sought to protect 
fintech firms from enforcement actions on the state and federal level, a 
 
 118. Compare H.R. 6118 §§ 2–6, with FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX OUTLINE, supra note 
41, at 1. 
 119. H.R. 6118 § 6(b); FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX OUTLINE, supra note 41, at 3. 
 120. H.R. 6118 §§ 6, 8; FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX OUTLINE, supra note 41, at 3. 
 121. See H.R. 6118 §§ 2–6 (comprising the FSIA’s oversight regime); see also FCA 
REGULATORY SANDBOX OUTLINE, supra note 41, at 3 (outlining the FCA’s plan to implement 
a regulatory sandbox, which includes the FCA’s oversight regime comprised of “sandbox 
units”). 
 122. Compare  H.R. 6118 § 2(2) (listing the U.S. financial regulators), with  UK 
Regulators, Government and Other Bodies, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (“FCA”), https://
www.fca.org.uk/about/uk-regulators-government-other-bodies (last updated Jan. 9, 2017) 
(listing the United Kingdom’s financial regulators). 
 123. See H.R. 6118 § 2(2) (listing the U.S. financial regulators); see also UK Regulators, 
Government and Other Bodies, supra note 122 (listing the FCA, the Prudential Regulation 
Authority, the Bank of England, the Financial Policy Committee, and The Treasury as the 
United Kingdom’s financial regulators). 
 124. See H.R. 6118 § 8(d) (indicating that federal agencies and states could seek 
enforcement actions against a fintech firm); see also FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX OUTLINE, 
supra note 41, at 9 (indicating that the FCA would be the authority bringing enforcement 
actions in its capacity as the singular financial regulator in the U.K.). 
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problem not encountered by the FCA.125  Furthermore, there is no 
indication that the FCA’s sandbox includes a safe harbor provision 
similar to that of the FSIA, which provides a free pass to fintechs awaiting 
agency decision post-petition submittal.126 
As compared to the FCA’s sandbox, the FSIA is truly unique in 
that it “gives the benefit of the doubt to fintech companies and places the 
onus on federal regulators to come up with credible reasons for why a 
waiver or modification should not be granted.”127  According to the FSIA, 
an agency is required to approve a fintech firm’s petition to enter into the 
sandbox so long as the firm “shows that it is more likely than not that [it] 
meets the requirements for establishing an alternative compliance 
plan.”128  Should an agency reject a fintech company’s petition under the 
FSIA, however, the agency is then required to explain the reason for 
disapproval and identify “persons likely to benefit[] from rejecting the 
petition.”129  The objective of this identification requirement is both 
transparency and promotion of fair competition in the marketplace.130  
Utilizing PwC’s “As, Bs, Cs, and Ds” of fintech, imagine a scenario in 
which an “A” (a large, well-established financial institution) stands to 
lose part of its overall financial services market share if a “D” (a disruptor 
or fast moving start-up fintech firm) were permitted to bring its 
innovation to market through the FSIA.131  By requiring the FSIO to 
disclose the “A” that stands to benefit from the “D’s” absence in the 
sandbox, the FSIA makes a good faith effort to require regulators to be 
 
 125. See H.R. 6118 § 8(d)(2) (indicating that “a State may [only] commence an 
enforcement action against a covered person . . . if . . . [a] court determines the agency’s action 
was arbitrary and capricious and the financial innovation has substantially harmed consumers 
within such State.”). 
 126. See id. § 6(d)(1) (“During the period after a covered person submits a petition under 
this section and before the agency receiving the petition makes a determination on the petition 
. . . an agency may not take an enforcement action against a covered person relating to the 
financial innovation that was the subject of the petition.”). 
 127. Lee Reiners, New Legislation Designed to Make the U.S. a Fintech Leader, THE 
FINREG BLOG (Nov. 17, 2016), https://sites.duke.edu/thefinregblog/2016/11/17/new-
legislation-designed-to-make-the-u-s-a-fintech-leader/.  
 128. H.R. 6118 § 7(b). 
 129. Id. § 7(c). 
 130. See Reiners, supra note 127 (“By publicly identifying incumbent firms that benefit 
from a banking agency rejecting a fintech company’s petition, it brings transparency to the 
process and ensures that regulation does more than simply protect firms already under the 
regulatory umbrella.”). 
 131. Garfinkel & Nicolacakis, supra note 33. 
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transparent and impartial to the “As, Bs, Cs, and Ds” of the fintech 
ecosystem.132 
D. Keeping up with the Joneses:  The United States Needs a 
Sandbox Too 
Under the current federal regulatory environment, fintech 
companies are faced with a multitude of questions and very few 
answers.133  Which agencies govern the fintech’s innovation?134  Which 
rules and regulations are applicable to the innovation?135  Do the pre-
mobile and pre-Internet regulations and rules apply to the fintech firm?136  
How can a small start-up maintain compliance in the ever-changing 
regulatory ecosystem?137   Likewise, regulators are faced with novel 
questions of their own.138  How do rules and regulations apply to the 
modern fintech firm business model?139  How can regulators “get their 
arms more firmly around” the fintech sector to stop regulatory arbitrage, 
while also promoting innovation?140 
The regulatory response to these questions has yet to provide 
clarity on the matter.141  Citing consumer protection concerns, the OCC 
has “soundly rejected the possibility of creating a [regulatory sandbox]” 
in the United States.142  Instead, regulators are looking for other, non-
sandbox avenues to promote innovation and competition in the United 
 
 132. See H.R. 6118 § 7 (requiring transparency after disapproval of a fintech’s petition by 
the relevant regulator); Garfinkel & Nicolacakis, supra note 33. 
 133. See Elliott, supra note 13 (summarizing the regulatory questions and concerns facing 
fintechs). 
 134. Elliott, supra note 13. 
 135. Elliott, supra note 13. 
 136. Elliott, supra note 13. 
 137. Elliott, supra note 13. 
 138. See Brian Knight, Innovation Will Stall Without a Regulatory Fintech ‘Sandbox,’ AM. 
BANKER, Nov. 15, 2016, at 1–3 [hereinafter Knight, Innovation Will Stall] (indicating that 
financial regulators, like the OCC, are unsure of the impact a sandbox might have on 
consumer safety). 
 139. See Elliott, supra note 13 (“[I]t’s not always clear specifically which rules and regs 
[a fintech has] to be in compliance with.”). 
 140. Elliott, supra note 13. 
 141. See Elliott, supra note 13 (“[T]here has been an obvious groundswell by the 
regulatory agencies that they need to get a deeper understanding of the proliferation of new 
financial services models that simply didn’t exist four or five years ago.”). 
 142. See Clozel, OCC’s Curry, supra note 94 (“Thomas Curry . . . soundly rejected the 
possibility of creating a ‘safe space’ for fintech firms to operate outside of consumer 
protection rules while they develop and test new products.”). 
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States.143  For example, the CFTC announced an innovation lab, called 
“LabCFTC,” which serves as a point of contact for “fintech innovators to 
engage with the CFTC [and] learn about the CFTC’s regulatory 
framework . . . .”144   
The CFPB also launched “Project Catalyst,” which allows 
innovators to request no-action letters from the CFPB.145  While acquiring 
a no-action letter would allow a fintech firm to take a product to market 
without fear of enforcement by the CFPB, relatively little success has 
been realized through Project Catalyst, likely because the no-action 
letters are “subject to modification or revocation at any time at the 
discretion of the [CFPB].”146  Since Project Catalyst’s inception in 2012, 
the CFPB has only issued one no-action letter, which was granted in 
September 2017 to “Upstart,” a fintech company that uses artificial 
intelligence to make credit and loan pricing decisions.147  This no-action 
letter, which lasts for three years, states that the CFPB has no “present 
intention” to recommend any supervisory or enforcement action, 
pursuant to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, against Upstart with 
regards to one of the fintech’s products.148  Furthermore, the no-action 
letter also states that it is not binding upon the CFPB, and that the CFPB 
may initiate a retroactive enforcement or supervisory action against 
Upstart if appropriate.149  Therefore, it would seem that the CFPB’s no-
action letters operate as more of a revocable promise than a safe harbor 
for innovators.150  Accordingly, Upstart could have the rug pulled out 
from under its feet at any time and for any reason deemed appropriate by 
the CFPB. 
 
 143. See Forshee, supra note 10 (introducing the CFTC’s LabCFTC and stating that “many 
. . . are skeptical that a sandbox will [ever] happen in the U.S. . . . .”). 
 144. U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, LABCFTC OVERVIEW, http://
www.cftc.gov/LabCFTC/Overview/index.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).  
 145. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, POLICY ON NO-ACTION LETTERS; INFORMATION 
COLLECTION 25 n.7 (Feb. 18, 2016), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201602_cfpb_no-
action-letter-policy.pdf.  
 146. Id. at 33; see McHenry, supra note 116 (describing the failed attempt by the CFPB at 
creating attractive no-action letters). 
 147. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU; UPSTART NO-ACTION LETTER (Sept. 14, 2017), http:/
/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201709_cfpb_upstart-no-action-letter.pdf; Merken, 
supra note 97. 
 148. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 147. 
 149. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 147. 
 150. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 147 (stating the various exceptions of the 
no-action letter that leave fulfilment of the CFPB’s “present intentions” up to the agency’s 
discretion). 
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Not without controversy, the OCC has proposed to foster 
innovation and reduce ambiguities through its Fintech Charter 
initiative.151  This special purpose charter aims to place an accepted 
fintech company under the same rules and regulations as national 
banks.152  Aside from the question of whether the OCC even has the 
authority to create a Fintech Charter, it is unclear that a special purpose 
charter for fintechs would provide regulatory relief to all but the most 
experienced and capital-flush fintech firms.153  While the “As” and “Bs” 
of the fintech ecosystem could certainly pass the OCC’s adequate capital 
and experienced management criteria, it is unlikely that a newly formed 
start-up could do the same.154  Therefore, it appears that the OCC’s 
Fintech Charter favors larger innovators while presenting a fruitless 
opportunity to smaller firms.155 
The OCC has also proposed the implementation of a bank-run 
“pilot” program to foster innovation and support fintech companies.156  
The OCC equates its pilot program with a regulatory sandbox, because 
the program would require regulators to create a safe space for innovation 
for the pilot program’s participants.157  This safe space, however, would 
provide absolutely no benefit to the vast majority of fintech firms, 
because “[e]ligible participants for the program . . . include OCC-
supervised banks and significant service providers, [and] fintechs in 
 
 151. See Edge, supra note 22 (discussing the lawsuit filed by the Conference of State Bank 
Supervisors in opposition of the OCC’s Fintech Charter). 
 152. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S LICENSING 
MANUAL: CHARTERS 50 (2016), https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/
licensing-manuals/charters.pdf [hereinafter Comptroller’s Licensing Manual].  
 153. See Roberts, supra note 17 (arguing that the OCC’s Fintech Charter would only 
benefit the largest fintechs and would not affect the business operations of smaller fintechs); 
see also Press Release, Jim Kurtze, Vice President of Communications, Conference of State 
Bank Supervisors, Statement by the Conference of State Bank Supervisors on Comptroller’s 
Announcement of New Federal Charters (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.csbs.org/news/press-
releases/pr2016/Pages/120216.aspx (arguing that the OCC lacks the power to establish full-
service bank charters to institutions that do not engage in deposit taking without Congress’ 
approval).  
 154. Comptroller’s Licensing Manual, supra note 152; see e.g., Roberts, supra note 17 
(indicating that the OCC’s Fintech Charter would only benefit the largest fintech companies). 
 155. Roberts, supra note 17. 
 156. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISIONS 
FOR IMPLEMENTING A RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION FRAMEWORK 12 (2016), https://www. 
occ.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/comments/recommendations-decisions-for-
implementing-a-responsible-innovation-framework.pdf [hereinafter OCC, IMPLEMENTING A 
RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION FRAMEWORK].  
 157. Id.  
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partnership with an OCC-supervised bank or significant service provider 
. . . .”158  While an independent fintech firm could not meet the pilot 
program’s criteria for entry, PayPal, for example, would be eligible for 
the OCC’s pilot program due to its partnership with Bank of America, an 
OCC-supervised bank.159  This eligibility requirement creates a catch-22 
situation for fintech firms, because the firm would be forced to choose 
between gaining the benefits of the sandbox by partnering with the 
competition—assuming that the fintech firm even has a partnership 
offer—or forego its benefits in favor of maintaining its separate existence 
and ability to compete directly with all OCC-regulated institutions.160  
Therefore, when compared to the FCA’s sandbox in the United Kingdom, 
the OCC’s pilot program is not a true fintech regulatory sandbox.161  
Based on the current impact of the pseudo-sandbox initiatives by 
the OCC, CFPB, and CFTC, the only viable option to promote innovation 
for fintech companies of all sizes would be a true regulatory sandbox.162  
Aside from logistical problems, consumer protection concerns appear to 
be the major federal and state concern about implementing a true 
regulatory sandbox.163  In a speech in London, former Comptroller of the 
Currency, Thomas Curry,164 said “[w]aiving compliance with consumer 
 
 158. Id.  
 159. See Press Release, Bank of America, Bank of America and PayPal Partner to Enable 
In-Store Payments and Account Linking (July 26, 2017), http://
newsroom.bankofamerica.com/press-releases/consumer-banking/bank-america-and-paypal-
partner-enable-store-payments-and-account-li (announcing the partnership between Bank of 
America and PayPal). 
 160. See OCC, IMPLEMENTING A RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION FRAMEWORK, supra note 156, 
at 8 (requiring pilot participating fintechs to partner with an OCC-supervised bank). 
 161. See OCC, IMPLEMENTING A RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION FRAMEWORK, supra note 156, 
at 11–12 (requiring a fintech to partner with a bank); see also FCA REGULATORY SANDBOX 
OUTLINE, supra note 41, at 1–20 (lacking a bank partnership requirement). 
 162. See Brnovich, supra note 18 (discussing the challenges to fintech companies under 
the United States’ current regulatory landscape and stating that a sandbox would “maintain 
our country’s competitiveness in the global marketplace.”). 
 163. See Clozel, OCC’s Curry, supra note 94 (indicating that the OCC’s opposition to 
sandbox implementation centers around consumer protection concerns). 
 164. Joseph Otting was confirmed as Curry’s replacement on November 16, 2017.  Otting 
has yet to opine on the OCC’s proposed fintech charter or the regulatory sandbox concept.  
Otting Confirmed as Comptroller of the Currency, ABA BANKING J. (Nov. 16, 2017), https:/
/bankingjournal.aba.com/2017/11/otting-confirmed-as-comptroller-of-the-currency/; 
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protection or safety . . . never makes sense . . . .”165  Due to his remarks, 
it would seem that Mr. Curry views a regulatory sandbox as the beginning 
of a “race to the bottom”—when a nation or region lessens regulation or 
oversight to attract investment during a state of cutthroat competition.166  
While a regulatory sandbox would likely attract venture capital 
investment in the U.S. economy, this does not necessitate that a “race to 
the bottom” would also occur.167  If the FCA’s sandbox is any indication, 
a properly tailored sandbox can “offer an environment where companies 
can innovate while ensuring consumers are protected.”168  This scenario 
seems like a win-win or a race to the top, not to the bottom.169 
IV. A REGULATORY SANDBOX FOR THE UNITED STATES 
The FSIA is a great example of how the United States could solve 
some of the regulatory problems affecting fintech firms, while also 
protecting consumers.170  Regulatory ambiguity would be quashed by the 
transparency and supervision required under the FSIA.171  Regulatory 
clarity and supervision would, in turn, reduce the often daunting upfront 
compliance costs incurred by disruptive fintechs who are forced to 
speculate as to the applicability of existing regulations to their specific 
business model.172  This problem is solved by continuous dialogue 
between the fintech company and its regulators within the sandbox, 
 
 165. Clozel, OCC’s Curry, supra note 94. 
 166. Race to the Bottom, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/race-
bottom.asp (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).  
 167. See Thomas J. Curry, Georgetown Law Remarks, supra note 7, at 1 (stating that 
investment in fintech companies has grown to over $24 billion worldwide); see also Sam 
Pearse, How the FCA’s Regulatory Sandbox scheme could help UK FinTech Startups, UK 
TECH NEWS (May 2, 2016), https://www.uktech.news/news/how-the-fcas-regulatory-
sandbox-scheme-could-help-uk-fintech-startups-20160502 (arguing that a regulatory 
sandbox attracts investment through lessening regulatory ambiguity while, at the same time, 
enabling the U.K. to evolve its regulatory environment to better understand how to regulate 
similar fintechs in the future). 
 168. See Knight, Innovation Will Stall, supra note 138 (promoting the regulatory sandbox 
and explaining the regulatory disfavor of a fintech sandbox). 
 169. Pearse, supra note 167 (arguing that a regulatory sandbox attracts investment through 
lessening regulatory ambiguity while, at the same time, enabling the U.K. to evolve its 
regulatory environment to better understand how to regulate similar fintechs in the future). 
 170. The Financial Services Innovation Act of 2016, H.R. 6118, 114th Cong. (2016). 
 171. See id. § 6 (requiring transparency by regulators who disapprove of a fintech’s 
petition for an enforceable compliance agreement). 
 172. See Pearse, supra note 167 (indicating that engaging in a direct dialogue with a 
regulator would relieve startups of some upfront costs). 
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which also allows the regulators to remain flexible, adapt, and learn how 
to better regulate novel business models within the financial 
marketplace.173  In this regard, the sandbox is mutually beneficial to 
innovators and regulators alike. 
Additionally, under the protections of a regulatory sandbox, 
fintech companies would be exempt from state or federal enforcement 
actions relating to their innovations, thereby increasing investor 
confidence and attracting capital contributions to the innovation.174  
Investors are not the only market participants whose confidence is 
increased by the presence of a sandbox, however.175  Fintechs also see a 
rise in the confidence of their customers due to the sandbox, because the 
sandbox supervision and regulation is an important hook to sell their 
products in the market.176 
Furthermore, there is no indication that consumers would be any 
less protected under a regulatory sandbox.177  The FSIA, for example, 
could be expanded to require regulators to limit a fintech company’s 
liability for inadvertent consumer protection violations to merely 
compensating the public for the harm it caused.178  In this manner, fintech 
companies would be exempt from federal fines or penalties, while still 
being required to re-pay harmed consumers.179  “Of the three 
justifications for sanctioning a company—compensation, punishment[,] 
and deterrence—only the first is appropriate for companies operating 
 
 173. See Pearse, supra note 167 (pointing out that the FCA’s early involvement and direct 
dialogue with fintechs and their innovations will position the regulator in a better place to 
“advise the [U.K.] on the changes necessary to evolve the [country’s] regulatory 
environment.”).  
 174. H.R. 6118 § 8; see DELOITTE, REGULATORY SANDBOX MAKING INDIA A GLOBAL 
FINTECH HUB 26 (July 2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/in/Documen 
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(indicating that a fintech sandbox increases investor confidence). 
 175. See I participated in a ‘Regulatory Sandbox’, BBVA (June 14, 2017), https://www.b 
bva.com/en/participated-regulatory-sandbox/ (interviewing a participant in the FCA’s 
sandbox and learning that the fintech’s regulation was an important hook to sell its products 
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 176. See id. (“[R]egulation is an important hook to sell our products. There’s no need to 
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 177. See Knight, Innovation Will Stall, supra note 138 (indicating that fintech companies 
operating in a sandbox would still be responsible for remuneration to harmed consumers). 
 178. See Knight, Innovation Will Stall, supra note 138 (“[A] U.S. sandbox could help 
encourage innovation without jeopardizing consumers. In exchange for greater transparency 
from the company, regulators could agree to limit the company’s potential liability for future 
consumer protection violations.”). 
 179. Knight, Innovation Will Stall, supra note 138. 
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with transparency and good faith.”180  Contrary to the position of the 
OCC, a regulatory sandbox is compatible with consumer protection.181 
A federal regulatory sandbox would also provide the same 
consumers it protects with ample benefits.182  Consumers would “be able 
to enjoy the fruits of innovation” created and augmented by the fintech 
sandbox, through increasing the sheer number of innovative products 
reaching the marketplace.183  Such fruits could also translate into lower 
costs for consumers and financial inclusion for the unserved and 
underserved consumers in emerging markets and developing 
economies.184  Additionally, fintech companies could see increased 
access to financial investment and higher company valuations due to 
decreased regulatory uncertainty.185 
Therefore, in order for the United States to both foster innovation 
and remain globally attractive to fintech firms and investors, 
implementing a sandbox in the near future is a necessity, not an option.186  
The FSIA was a great example of what an American regulatory sandbox 
could contribute to fintech innovators.187  Using the FSIA as a model, 
regulators and politicians should sit down and reconsider the need for a 
regulatory sandbox—before we start losing players to a more attractive 
team. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Regulatory sandboxes, if properly developed, benefit fintech 
companies and consumers alike by encouraging innovation.188  Countries 
and nations all over the world are following the United Kingdom’s lead 
and have established, or plan on establishing, their own regulatory 
sandboxes.189  Other than the possible reintroduction of the FSIA to 
Congress and a few state-led sandbox discussions, the United States 
seemingly does not intend to follow suit.190  Based upon misconceptions 
and preconceived notions regarding the dangers of sandbox 
implementation, the OCC and other federal regulators have all but turned 
their back on the concept.191  Therefore, in order to stay competitive in 
the global fintech landscape, it is time for Congress to reconsider 
implementing a federal sandbox with legislation similar to the FSIA.192 
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